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Abstract Sexual assault is an insidious problem in the
United States military. In 2005 the Department of Defense
(DoD) created the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office, which centralizes responsibility for sexual assault
training. However, this training initiative has undergone
little evaluation by outside researchers. Addressing this
need, we analyzed responses from over 24,000 active duty
personnel who completed the 2010 DoD Workplace and
Gender Relations Survey. We assessed whether sexual
assault training exposure (None, Minimal, Partial, or
Comprehensive) predicted accurate knowledge of sexual
assault resources and protocols. Using a social-ecological
framework, we investigated whether institutional and
individual factors influenced Service members’ training
exposure and judgment of training effectiveness. Accord-
ing to our results, exposure to comprehensive training
predicted lower sexual assault incidence and superior
knowledge. However, comprehensive training differed as a
function of military branch, rank, gender, and sexual
assault history. Judgments of training effectiveness also
varied across these dimensions. Our results highlight the
importance of considering context, gender, and victimiza-
tion history when evaluating institutional efforts to end
sexual violence. The DoD’s 2010 annual report on military
sexual assault concluded that ‘‘most Active Duty members
receive effective training on sexual assault’’ (p. 104). Our
results cast doubt on that assertion.
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Pentagon officials can tell you exactly how many
tanks and Humvees the new C-17 ‘‘Globemaster III’’
can carry. They can tell you the height, weight and
speed of every airplane and ship…But ask them how
many military women have been attacked by ser-
vicemen and their statistical wizardry vanishes.
(Pardue and Moniz 1996, p. A8)
Sexual violence is alarmingly common in the military—
especially against female personnel. As former California
Democratic Representative Jane Harman (2008) testified,
‘‘a woman who signs up to protect her country is more
likely to be raped by a fellow soldier than killed by enemy
fire.’’ This problem has reached such proportions that it has
been dubbed an ‘‘invisible war’’ (Ziering et al. 2012).
Studies estimate that 9–13 % of Service women and 1–2 %
of Service men endure sexual assault per year of military
employment (Bostock and Daley 2007; Lipari et al. 2008;
Street et al. 2008). These figures likely represent conser-
vative estimates, with sexual assault being the most un-
derreported act of violence in the U.S. (Bachman and
Taylor 1994; Kilpatrick et al. 1992). The Armed Services
number almost 1.5 million personnel (Defense Manpower
Data Center 2013b), making this a type of workplace
violence with enormous scope. The Department of Defense
(DoD) knows there is a problem, which begs the question:
what is being done about it?
The current study makes important contributions by
examining the DoD’s sexual assault training efforts. More
specifically, we test whether this prevention and education
program achieves one of its fundamental goals: fostering
accurate knowledge about sexual assault resources and
protocols among active duty personnel. Drawing from a
social-ecological framework, we also investigate influences
of institutional and individual factors on training exposure
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and effectiveness (operationalizing ‘‘effectiveness’’ with
measures developed by the military). Using data collected
by the DoD, we reach conclusions that diverge from mil-
itary conclusions. More specifically, we find that military
sexual assault training is often lacking in content and
efficacy—especially in the eyes of personnel for whom it is
most relevant (e.g., those who are at greatest risk of sexual
assault).
Sexual Assault in a Military Context
Members of the Armed Services, especially women, are at
greater risk for encountering sexual assault than civilians
(Bostock and Daley 2007), and aspects of military culture
help explain this trend. With its history of excluding women
from full participation (e.g., combat), the U.S. military is a
hypermasculine, male-dominated institution. As of the year
2009, the approximately 198,000 women serving in the
military could access 92 % of all specialties, yet occupied
just 14.3 % of positions available to them (Department of
Defense 2009). The idealized soldier is tough, fearless, and
unwavering; this image is more in line with stereotypical
masculinity (e.g., assertive, strong) than femininity (e.g.,
sensitive, fragile; Spence and Helmreich 1980). When ste-
reotypes associated with a certain group (e.g., women) clash
with stereotypes linked to a particular role (e.g., combat), this
fuels unfavorable biases toward members of that group
(Eagly and Karau 2002; Heilman and Eagly 2008). These
negative expectations translate into negative treatment. In
the words of Army Sergeant Sarah Scully, ‘‘In the army, any
sign that you are a woman means that you are automatically
ridiculed and treated as inferior’’ (quoted in Benedict 2010,
p. 5). Ultimately, we argue that mismatches between gender
stereotypes and job roles set the stage for personal and pro-
fessional penalties for military women, ranging from short-
ened career ladders to derisive comments to physical
punishment in the form of sexual assault.
Experiencing sexual assault can be psychologically
devastating, and this is especially true in the military
ecological context. According to Benedict (2010),
From the victim’s point of view, rape is torture
because it is a painful and violent attack on the most
intimate part of your body and an attempt to destroy
your dignity and autonomy. Rape and sexual assault
by someone on whom you depend—whether a parent,
partner, or comrade-in-arms—is more traumatizing
than assault by anyone else. (p. 6)
Survivors of military sexual trauma must often reside and
work alongside their assailants, increasing the distress
associated with the assault experience (Bell and Reardon
2011; Defense Manpower Data Center 2013a). Service
members who have been sexually assaulted must contend
with competing messages from military training (i.e., you
should rely unconditionally upon fellow troop members—
your life may depend on it) versus assault encounters (i.e.,
you cannot trust fellow troop members—to do so risks
violent attack). Finally, the stereotypes associated with the
idealized Service member (e.g., strength, powerfulness)
contrast with the assault survivor experience (e.g., feelings
of helplessness and violation; Bell and Reardon 2011).
Given these aspects of military context, it is unsurprising
that military sexual assault has adverse consequences for
mental health. Both female and male survivors of military
sexual trauma are more likely to report general psychological
distress, anxiety, depression, eating disorders, sexual dys-
function, sleep disturbances, alcohol dependence, drug
abuse, suicidal ideation, and self-harm (Harned et al. 2002;
Kimerling et al. 2007; Martin et al. 2000). Survivors of
military sexual assault report greater likelihood of develop-
ing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Kang et al. 2005;
Surı´s et al. 2004). Physiological consequences of sexual
trauma include chronic health issues (Kimerling et al. 2007;
Sadler et al. 2000), perceptions of health dissatisfaction
(Harned et al. 2002), as well as negative physiological health
in general (Martin et al. 2000). Survivors of military sexual
assault are also less likely to report satisfaction with their
work and coworkers; in turn, these job attitudes are associ-
ated with poorer organizational commitment and workgroup
productivity (Harned et al. 2002). Collectively, this research
illustrates that the distress associated with undergoing sex-
ualized violence is distinct from other forms of military
trauma (Fontana and Rosenheck 1998), and that experienc-
ing sexual assault while on active duty is detrimental to
Service members’ professional, psychological, and physical
health. Campbell et al. (2009) theorized that factors at mul-
tiple levels of social-ecology contribute to sexual assault
experiences and outcomes. For example, individual-level
factors (e.g., sociodemographics), meso/exosystem factors
(e.g., institutional structure), and macrosystem factors (e.g.,
cultural norms) all play an important role in determining
survivors’ experiences after an assault and perpetuating a
rape-prone culture (Campbell et al. 2009). Following this
work, a social-ecological model of military sexual assault,
and its impact upon the larger community, would consider
the interplay among individual factors (e.g., gender, sexual
assault survivorship), institutional factors (e.g., Service
branch, military hierarchy), and the broader context (e.g., the
uniqueness of military culture).
Institutional Response to Military Sexual Assault
Despite the breadth of research documenting the incidence
and impact of military sexual assault, leadership in the Armed
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Forces has been slow to take action. One of the most visible
military scandals took place at the 1991 Tailhook Association
symposium (Tailhook Association, n.d.). Over the course of
five days, eighty-three women and seven men endured sexual
assault and harassment during the convention meeting. Many
of these victims reported their abuse, yet no punitive measures
were taken. Over the past twenty years, military officials have
responded to sexual assault crimes on a case-by-case basis.
Not until 2005 did the DoD identify a critical need for
organization-wide reform. That year marked the creation of
the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAP-
RO) to serve as the central point of responsibility and
resources for military sexual assault (Department of
Defense 2010; see also Department of Defense Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office, n.d.). According
to the Department of Defense (2010), this new Office
‘‘requires each Military Service to maintain its own SAPR
program, document both Restricted [a confidential option
that does not result in an official investigation] and Unre-
stricted Reports of sexual assault, investigate Unrestricted
Reports of sexual assault, and hold subjects appropriately
accountable’’ (p. 1). In other words, the SAPRO oversees
each military branch, and in turn, each branch is responsible
for training personnel about sexual assault policies,
reporting procedures, and resources. These trainings aim to
educate Service members about sexual assault (and what to
do if an assault occurs) and prevent its occurrence.
To evaluate institutional climate and policy effective-
ness, the DoD conducts a large survey of all active duty
personnel—the Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of
Active Duty Members (WGRA) about every 4 years (e.g.,
1998; 2002; 2006; 2010). The 2006 WGRA added more
detailed questions about experiences of ‘‘unwanted sexual
contact’’ in the military, defined as ‘‘intentional sexual
contact that was against a person’s will or which occurred
when the person did not or could not consent’’ (Defense
Manpower Data Center 2013a, p. 1). In 2008, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) urged the mili-
tary to evaluate the effectiveness of its sexual assault
training program, and the 2010 WGRA included items
assessing Service members’ experiences and perceptions of
sexual assault training. For example, items asked trainees
how effective the training was at preventing sexual assault
and explaining reporting options (i.e., restricted/unre-
stricted). Using these data, the DoD’s 2010 annual report
on sexual assault in the military stated:
Most women and men were positive in their assess-
ment of the effectiveness of their training… Based on
this [sic] data, the Department concludes that most
Active Duty members receive effective training on
sexual assault reporting and the options available to
do so. (p. 104)
Other evidence, however, points to flaw in military sexual
assault training programs. For example, the SAPRO
mandates that all Service members receive periodic sexual
assault prevention and response training, but the enforce-
ment and content of such trainings are not consistent across
all branches of the military (Defense Manpower Data
Center 2013a). Moreover, the DoD has recommended that
training ‘‘incorporate adult learning theory, which includes
group participation and interaction’’ (Department of
Defense 2013, p. 62). However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that this often fails to happen; an official DoD
report describes that, at about half of all Coast Guard
installations surveyed, trainings ‘‘relied heavily on power
point briefings and… participants were not engaged’’ (U.S.
GAO 2008, p. 26). Moreover, other stakeholders reported
that training is not scenario-based, and that many Service
members do not pay attention or take the training seriously
(Schmid 2010; U.S. GAO 2008). Thus, sexual assault
training varies in depth, breadth, and frequency across
different levels of military context (e.g., Service branch).
Another flaw involves lack of attention to trainer and
trainee demographic composition. Naval trainings, for
example, are conducted with both junior and senior per-
sonnel. One installation instructed 800 Service members in
one sitting (U.S. GAO 2008). Given military culture and
hierarchy, such a delivery would not encourage junior
trainees to ask clarifying questions or share their opinions
(Schmid 2010). The trainers themselves may also affect the
quality of training. The coordination and implementation
of SAPRO programs largely relies on Commanders and
SAPRO Coordinators (U.S. GAO 2012). Recently, there
have been several well-publicized instances in which those
individuals, whose jobs are to prevent sexual assault and
protect survivors, have been charged with sexual assault
themselves. For example, a sergeant responsible for sexual
assault prevention at Fort Hood is under investigation for
sexual assault (USA Today 2013). While this example may
not represent the norm, it still calls the DoD’s sexual
assault training program into question; without systematic
evaluation, there is no way to know if these programs are
actually useful in this context. The current study takes up
this aim.
Current Study: Considering Individual
and Institutional Factors
Existing research on military sexual assault training is not
only limited, but also very general. For instance, the DoD’s
2010 annual report on sexual assault in the military eval-
uates training efforts (e.g., via Service members’ self-
reported judgments of training), but only reports general
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percentages collapsing across categories of military per-
sonnel. With this in mind, our first research aim was to
examine how training exposure relates to a critical out-
come: actual knowledge of sexual assault resources and
protocols. We hypothesized that:
H1 Knowledge of sexual assault resources and protocols
would increase with exposure to more comprehensive
sexual assault training.
Moreover, we examined how training exposure varied by
institutional context. Approaches to sexual assault training
and prevention differ by Service branch (Department of
Defense 2010), and some research suggests that rates of
sexual assault may also vary by branch and rank (e.g., Fire-
stone et al. 2012; Harned et al. 2002; Hay and Elig 1999).
Thus, it is important to consider contextual and institutional
influences on experiences of sexual assault training. How-
ever, existing research on military training generalizes
across military personnel. For instance, Kelley et al. (2005)
examined trainee satisfaction with the Navy’s Sexual
Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) training program, but
did not report whether or how satisfaction varied among
trainee subgroups. Rank, or power within the military, may
affect judgments of training. Rigid organizational hierar-
chies and power imbalances play an important role in mili-
tary sexual assault (Harned et al. 2002; Morris 1996; Sadler
et al. 2003). Lower-ranking military personnel are more
likely to actually experience sexual trauma while on active
duty (Firestone et al. 2012; Harned et al. 2002), and therefore
have more experiential knowledge with which to evaluate
their training. On the other hand, higher-ranking personnel
may have more knowledge and training on military sexual
assault, due to their longer tenure and responsibilities with
respect to sexual assault reporting protocols (Hillman 2009;
Turchik and Wilson 2010). In the event of experiencing
sexual victimization, Enlisted Service members have little
latitude to exit the military, whereas Officers do not adhere to
these same mandates for obligatory service (Sims et al.
2005). As such, rank is an important individual factor to
consider with respect to access to and evaluation of sexual
assault training content. Given these competing proposals,
and lack of prior research on this issue, we investigated the
effects of institutional factors via a research question:
RQ1 Does exposure to sexual assault training vary by
Service branch and military rank (enlisted vs. officer)?
In addition, gender and history of sexual assault are two
individual-level factors that are important to consider when
examining training exposure. The military strives to pro-
vide sexual assault training to all Service members, so we
did not expect sheer access to training to differ by gender
or survivor status. However, women endure more sexual
violence than men, in both military and civilian life
(Bostock and Daley 2007); as a result, women may have
more knowledge or awareness of sexual assault and/or
prior experience with sexual assault policies, reporting
procedures, investigations, etc. Studies of sexual assault
prevention on college campuses suggest that women often
enter training with a more critical outlook on rape than men
(Breitenbecher 2000). As a result, men’s understanding and
attitudes about rape become more similar to that of women
after some interventions (Breitenbecher 2000). Moreover,
Service members who have experienced military sexual
trauma are also more likely to have actually used organi-
zational reporting mechanisms. Research on civilian sexual
trauma frequently examines the quality of the legal and
medical system via the experiences and perceptions of
actual sexual assault survivors (e.g., Campbell 2005, 2006,
2008; Campbell et al. 1999, 2001b; DuMont et al. 2009;
Felson and Pare 2008). Greater knowledge of and actual
experience with sexual assault may foster more critically
evaluative descriptions of training. We hypothesized that:
H2 Women (compared to men) and sexual assault survi-
vors (compared to non-victims) would be more critical of
military sexual assault training—evaluating it as less com-
prehensive in its exposure to important content domains
In addition to considering reports of training exposure,
we also investigated perceived training effectiveness, from
the perspective of recent trainees. Specifically, how effec-
tive was the training at (1) reducing/preventing sexual
assault, and (2) explaining the difference between sexual
assault reporting options? It is standard practice in the
military to use trainee self-report to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of military sexual assault training efforts (e.g.,
Department of Defense 2010). However, military conclu-
sions about perceived effectiveness have neglected differ-
ences across military personnel. Thus, we again examined
institutional (Service branch and rank) and individual fac-
tors (gender, and sexual assault history) that may influence
judgments of training effectiveness. Hypotheses about
influences of Service branch or rank on judgments of
training effectiveness are difficult to derive. As noted
earlier, each branch implements its own sexual assault
training. Training effectiveness therefore might differ by
branch, but it is unclear how. Lower-ranking military
personnel are more likely to experience sexual trauma
(Firestone et al. 2012; Harned et al. 2002), so they may
have more experience using reporting procedures. Con-
versely, higher-ranking personnel may have more knowl-
edge of the incidence of sexual assault and reporting
procedures, due to chain-of-command protocol for report-
ing sexual assault (Hillman 2009; Turchik and Wilson
2010). Given the different possibilities with respect to
Service branch and rank, we kept this open as another
research question:
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RQ2 Do members of different Service branches and
ranks (enlisted vs. officer) differ in their evaluations of
sexual assault training as effective at (a) reducing/pre-
venting sexual assault, and (b) explaining reporting
options?
Despite military efforts to reduce sexual assault, inci-
dence rates remain unacceptably high (Lipari et al. 2008;
Street et al. 2008). As stated above, women experience a
greater amount of sexual violence in both military and
civilian life (Bostock and Daley 2007). As a result, women
may be more perceptive of sexual assault (Harris and
Miller 2000). Women may also give greater consideration
to reporting options, in the event an assault would occur. It
is also more likely that Service women and men who have
experienced sexual assault would consider or actually uti-
lize reporting procedures. Research on civilian sexual
assault suggests that interactions with the medical and legal
system can be extremely challenging for victims (Campbell
2005, 2006, 2008; Campbell et al. 1999, 2001a, b; Camp-
bell and Raja 2005; Ullman and Townsend 2007). For
example, survivors are often poorly informed or unpre-
pared for navigating the legal system (Ullman and Town-
send 2007). Social system personnel (e.g., doctors, police
officers) underestimate the impact they are having on the
victim, and the ways in which their actions and statements
may be confusing or distressing (Campbell 2008). A study
of sexual assault help-seeking in the military found that
military legal officials often discouraged victims from
reporting or refused to accept their reports altogether
(Campbell and Raja 2005). In the military, many survivors
choose not to formally report their sexual assault experi-
ence because they fear disbelief, inaction, or retaliation
(Bell and Reardon 2011; Firestone et al. 2012). However, it
is possible that lack of knowledge about reporting options
or negative experiences interacting with support personnel
contributes to reporting attitudes and behaviors. Given
these findings, we predicted that both women and sexual
assault survivors would evaluate sexual assault training as
less ‘‘effective.’’ Specifically:
H3 Women (compared to men) and sexual assault sur-
vivors (compared to non-victims) would be more critical of
military sexual assault training—evaluating it as (a) less
effective at reducing/preventing sexual assault, and (b) less
effective at explaining reporting options.
In summary, the overarching aim of this project was to
evaluate military sexual assault training in several ways.
First, we tested whether training exposure predicted actual
knowledge of sexual assault resources and protocols. Next,
we examined how training exposure varied by institutional
(Service branch, rank) and individual (gender, sexual
assault history) factors. Finally, we investigated how
judgments of training effectiveness differed according to
those same factors. All analyses relied on the DoD’s own
data, collected in the 2010 WGRA.
Method
Participants and Procedure
The current study was a secondary analysis of data col-
lected by the DoD. Members of the U.S. Military com-
pleted the 2010 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of
Active Duty Members (2010 WGRA), which was designed
to sample even numbers of individuals across sex/gender,
Service branch, and race/ethnicity. The survey was
administered online and on-paper to approximately 90,391
active duty members, of whom 26,505 (29.32 %) offered
usable data (Defense Manpower Data Center 2010). For a
detailed explanation of survey and sampling procedures,
including the complete survey, see Defense Manpower
Data Center (DMDC 2010) and Rock et al. (2011). For the
current study, we focused on Enlisted members
(n = 17,288, or 70.2 %) and Officers (n = 7,322, or
29.8 %). Of this group, there were 15,859 men (59.8 %)
and 10,646 women (40.2 %). With respect to branch, 6,963
(26.3 %) were affiliated with the Air Force, 6,703 (25.3 %)
were Army soldiers, 2,476 (9.3 %) were Coast Guard
personnel, 5,033 (19.0 %) were Marines, and 5,330
(20.1 %) were members of the Navy.
Measures
Sex/Gender
Participants indicated their sex by checking 1 = male or
2 = female. If this item was skipped, administrators of the
2010 WGRA used Service members’ records to determine
their sex.1
Service Branch
Administrators used active duty members’ records to
determine their Service affiliation (Air Force, Army, Coast
Guard, Marine Corps, or Navy).
1 Feminist theorists have long articulated the differences between sex
and gender. Gender, as a concept, allows us to differentiate
biological/physiological differences between women and men (i.e.,
sex) from the social roles and characteristics that are assigned to
women and men (Delphy 1993; Oakley 1972/1985; Scott 1988).
While female/male typically designates ‘‘sex,’’ we conceptualize this
variable as ‘‘gender’’ in our analyses. Gender, and the social meanings
and experiences associated with it, is a more useful category of
analysis when examining social structures and phenomena (Scott
1988).
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Rank
Administrators used Service members’ record data to
determine participants’ and paygrade (E1–E3/Unknown
Enlisted, E4, E5–E6, E7–E9, W1–W5, O1–O3/Unknown
Officers, or O4–O6). For clarity and ease of interpretation,
we collapsed across paygrade levels to create two groups:
Enlisted (1 = E1–E9) and Commissioned Officers
(2 = O1–O6). We excluded Warrant Officers (W1–W5)
from analyses, due to the small size and ambiguous social
power of this group.
Sexual Assault Survivor Status
Participants indicated whether or not they experienced any
of five types of sexual assault over the past twelve months
of military employment. The measure began with the stem,
‘‘Have you experienced any of the following intentional
sexual contacts that were against your will or occurred
when you did not or could not consent where someone…’’
(emphasis in original). Behaviors then ranged from
unwanted touching to attempted rape to completed rape,
e.g., ‘‘Sexually touched you (e.g., intentional touching of
genitalia, breasts, or buttocks) or made you sexually touch
them’’, ‘‘Attempted to make you have sexual intercourse,
but was not successful’’, and ‘‘Made you perform or receive
oral sex, anal sex, or penetration by a finger or object’’). In
the dataset, WGRA administrators assigned participants
who experienced any of these five behaviors a code of 1
(past-year survivor). All others were assigned a code of 0
(past-year non-victim).
Training Exposure
Personnel reported whether they had received ‘‘any mili-
tary training during the past 12 months on topics related to
sexual assault’’ (emphasis original), 1 = No and 2 = Yes.
Those who responded ‘‘yes’’ completed ten follow-up
items about that training. Trainees rated (on a scale from
1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) the extent to
which their training covered a range of different content
areas. Sample items included: ‘‘Provides a good under-
standing of what actions are considered sexual assault,’’
‘‘Explains the reporting options available if a sexual assault
occurs,’’ and ‘‘Teaches how to intervene when you witness
a situation involving a fellow Service member (bystander
intervention).’’ Averaging these 10 items into a scale,
Cronbach’s alpha was .98.
To check the validity of this training exposure measure,
we analyzed two items assessing participants’ satisfaction
with the information available about restricted and unre-
stricted reporting procedures for sexual assault (e.g., ‘‘How
satisfied have you been with the availability of information
on how to file an unrestricted report?’’). Response options
ranged from 1 = very dissatisfied to 5 = very satisfied, and
the two items were averaged to give a mean satisfaction
with the availability of reporting information score.
Knowledge of Sexual Assault Resources and Protocol
Six dichotomous (either yes/no or true/false) questions
assessed participants’ knowledge of sexual assault resour-
ces (e.g., ‘‘I am aware of my installation’s Sexual Assault
Awareness Month programs’’) and protocols (e.g., ‘‘When
you are in a social setting, it is your duty to stop a fellow
Service member from doing something potentially harmful
to themselves or others’’). Responses yes and true were
coded as 1 and responses no and false were coded as 0.
These six items were summed to create a single measure of
knowledge of resources and protocols (range 0-6); higher
scores indicate greater (accurate) knowledge. Each item
contains a ‘‘correct’’ answer; thus, this provided an objec-
tive measure of employee knowledge.
Judgments of Training Effectiveness
Two items assessed employee judgments of training
effectiveness. The stem read, ‘‘In your opinion, how
effective was the training you received in…’’ followed by
‘‘Actually reducing/preventing sexual assault or behaviors
related to sexual assault’’ and ‘‘Explaining the difference
between restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual
assault.’’ Trainees responded on a scale from 1 to 4;
1 = not at all effective, 2 = slightly effective, 3 = mod-
erately effective, and 4 = very effective. Because these
questions operationalized ‘‘effectiveness’’ very differently,
we did not combine them into a scale. There are downsides
to using self-report when evaluating the effectiveness of
any training program, but the military routinely uses items
such as these to assess and report on the ‘‘effectiveness’’ of
its sexual assault prevention efforts. We followed that same
procedure here, to determine whether we would reach
similar conclusions as the DoD.
Protections Against Common Method Bias
When assessing experiences of sexual assault and judg-
ments of sexual assault policy, the DoD relies on self-
report, as noted above. This is appropriate for this research
domain, because (1) sexual assault typically has no wit-
nesses and goes unreported, (2) when survivors do make
reports, that process is often private (unobservable to
anyone except the complainant and complaint recipient),
and (3) people vary widely in their experiences of institu-
tional response systems. Reliance on single-source, self-
report data raises concerns about common method bias,
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however. When conducting the 2010 WGRA and related
surveys, the DoD followed recommendations received in
the 1990s from social scientists—most notably, Louise F.
Fitzgerald and Fritz Drasgow. Specifically, features were
built into the WGRA research design to minimize common
method bias ex ante¸ as recommended by Podsakoff et al.
(2003; see also Conway and Lance 2010). First, to reduce
evaluation apprehension, participants were assured that
their responses would remain confidential, and individually
identifying data would never be reported. Second, the
surveys assessed sexual assault survivor status independent
of training-related measurement, with several pages of
items in between; this created ‘‘methodological separation’’
in the measurement of these constructs (Podsakoff et al.
2003, pp. 887–888) and decreased the chances that mem-
ories of sexual assault would bias judgments of training.
Third, scale endpoints and formats varied across the pre-
dictor and criterion variables, which diminished method
biases stemming from anchor and endpoint effects. In
addition to this array of procedural remedies, we conducted
an ex post statistical analysis—the Harman single-factor
test—to determine whether common method variance had
unduly influenced results. We found no single factor, which
argues against a monomethod-bias explanation of results.
Results
Descriptive Results
Overall, 2 % of the sample (n = 542), or 4 % of women
(n = 430) and 0.7 % of men (n = 112), reported experi-
encing sexual assault within the last 12 months. Of those
sexual assault survivors, a significant majority were women
(79 %), v2(1, N = 26,505) = 353.24, p \ .001. Addition-
ally, Enlisted personnel (86 % of survivors, n = 457) were
significantly more likely to have endured sexual assault
than Officers (14 % of survivors, n = 77), v2(1, N =
24,610) = 61.40, p \ .001; this was true for both female
(v2(1, N = 10,495) = 30.66, p \ .001) and male (v2(1,
N = 14,115) = 15.13, p \ .001) Service members. Sexual
assault incidence also differed across military Service
branch. Past-year sexual assault survivors were more likely
to serve in the Army (32.1 %, n = 174) and Marine Corps
(23.2 %, n = 126), but less likely to serve in the Air Force
(16.2 %, n = 88) and Coast Guard (6.3 %, n = 34), v2(4,
N = 26,505) = 43.36, p \ .001; however, this was only
true for women, v2(4, n = 10,646) = 56.27, p \ .001.
Among women who were sexually assaulted in the past
year, 34 % (n = 146) were serving in the Army, 21.9 %
(n = 94) were in the Marine Corps, 21.6 % (n = 93) were
in the Navy, 17.2 % (n = 74) were in the Air Force, and
5.3 % (n = 23) were in the Coast Guard. Among men who
were sexually assaulted in the past year, 28.6 % (n = 32)
were in the Marine Corps, 25 % (n = 28) were serving in
the Army, 24.1 % (n = 27) were in the Navy, 12.5 %
(n = 14) were in the Air Force, and 9.8 % (n = 11) were
in the Coast Guard. See Table 1 for correlations, means,
and standard deviations.
Cluster Analysis: Identifying Training Exposure
Groups
We followed a participant-centered approach to examine
differences in exposure to sexual assault training. First, all
participants who reported having no military training on
sexual assault during the last 12 months (9 % of sample;
n = 2,112) were combined into a No Training group. Next,
we used k-means clustering (e.g., Hartigan 1975; Mac-
Queen 1967; Wagstaff et al. 2001) to identify groups
among the remaining participants, whose surveys indicated
that they had received sexual assault training in the past
year. We based this cluster analysis on the ten sexual
assault training exposure items, and found three groups.
The Comprehensive Training Exposure group (54 % of
sample; n = 13,045) reported that their sexual assault
training was comprehensive, exposing them to a broad
range of topics (training exposure scale M = 4.96,
SD = .11). The Partial Training Exposure group (30 % of
sample; n = 7,378) reported that their training had covered
some important topics, but missed others (M = 3.99,
SD = .15). Finally, the Minimal Training Exposure group
(7 % of sample; n = 1,720) reported that their training had
missed important topics—painting a picture of incomplete
or poor training (M = 2.96, SD = .34).
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for scales
and items
Variables Mean (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 5
1. Content coverage 4.49 (0.65) 1–5 –
2. Availability of
information on
reporting
4.16 (0.94) 1–5 .51 –
3. Knowledge of
resources and
protocols
4.30 (1.28) 0–6 .24 .28 –
4. Effective at
reducing/
preventing sexual
assault
3.30 (0.79) 1–4 .51 .33 .31 –
5. Effective at
explaining
reporting
3.46 (0.73) 1–4 .60 .52 .28 .66 –
All correlations significant at p \ .001
SD standard deviation
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As a check on the validity of these groups, we con-
ducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA); training expo-
sure group served as the predictor, and the criterion
variable was the item assessing satisfaction with informa-
tion available on sexual assault reporting procedures. For
the three exposure groups to differ in a meaningful way,
information satisfaction should also differ across the
groups. For example, if those in the Comprehensive
Exposure group received training that covered more topics
than those in the Minimal Exposure group, then Compre-
hensive Exposure participants should report greater satis-
faction with the availability of information on reporting.
We found significant group differences for satisfaction
reporting F(2, 22,098) = 3,583.57, p \ .001. Bonferroni
post hoc tests confirmed that personnel in the Compre-
hensive Exposure group were more satisfied with avail-
ability of information (M = 4.58, SD = .75) than Partial
Exposure (M = 3.84, SD = .81, d = .95) and Minimal
Exposure personnel (M = 3.24, SD = .93, d = 1.60).
Those in the Partial group were also more satisfied than the
Minimal group (d = .69). All differences were significant,
p \ .001. These between-group differences, with large to
very large effect sizes, support the validity of the training
exposure grouping variable.
Does Training Exposure Predict Accurate Knowledge?
A key goal of training is to teach accurate knowledge of
military resources and protocols surrounding sexual
assault. Descriptively speaking, 17.9 % of Service mem-
bers responded with 100 % accuracy to the six knowledge
questions. Conversely, 33.1 % responded with accuracy of
50 % or less (giving correct responses to three or fewer
items).
To test our first hypothesis, we conducted an ANOVA
with training exposure group (four levels: None, Mini-
mal, Partial, and Comprehensive) as the independent
variable and accurate knowledge of resources/protocols
as the dependent variable. There were significant differ-
ences for knowledge across the four groups, F(3, 18,
147) = 461.93, p \ .001. According to Bonferroni post
hoc tests, the Comprehensive Exposure group (M = 4.56,
SD = 1.21) had significantly greater accuracy in their
knowledge of resources and protocol than all other
groups (p \ .001), with an average effect size of
d = .64. The Partial Exposure group (M = 4.01,
SD = 1.24) had significantly greater accuracy than the
Minimal Exposure group (M = 3.70, SD = 1.38;
d = .24) and No Training group (M = 3.56, SD = 1.30;
d = .35), p \ .001. There were no significant knowledge
differences between the No Training and Minimal
Exposure groups.
Does Training Exposure Vary by Institutional
and Individual Factors?
Next, we conducted a series of Chi Square analyses to test
whether sexual assault training exposure differed as a
function of military branch (Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
Air Force, Coast Guard), rank (Enlisted vs. Officer), gender
(women vs. men), or survivor status (past-year sexual
assault survivor vs. past-year non-victim). Table 2 contains
the actual values, expected values, and proportions across
each of the four training groups. Training exposure varied
by branch, v2 (12, N = 24,255) = 340.27, p \ .001. Spe-
cifically, Service members in the Air Force described the
greatest exposure to comprehensive sexual assault training.
Conversely, personnel in the Navy, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard reported the least exposure, and Army soldiers
fell somewhere in between.
Training exposure also differed by rank, v2 (3,
N = 22,490) = 197.63, p \ .001. Officers (compared to
Enlisted personnel) were significantly more likely to have
received no sexual assault training in the prior year.
Additionally, Enlisted personnel were more likely to report
both Minimal Exposure and Comprehensive Exposure to
training than Officers, whereas Officers were more likely to
report that they received Partial Exposure.
As hypothesized, we found significant differences across
training groups by gender, v2 (3, N = 24,255) = 26.01,
p \ .001. Service women were more likely to report that
trainings provided Minimal Exposure and Partial Exposure
than Service men, and Service men were more likely to
report Comprehensive Exposure. We found no gender
differences in the No Training group.
There were significant differences across training groups
for survivor status, v2 (3, N = 24,255) = 86.73, p \ .001.
Past-year sexual assault survivors were more likely to be in
the No Training group than past-year non-victims. Addi-
tionally, past-year survivors were more likely to report that
trainings provided Minimal Exposure compared to non-
victims (who perceived more Comprehensive Exposure).
There were no survivor status differences in Partial
Exposure.
Do Judgments of Training Effectiveness Vary
by Institutional and Individual Factors?
Finally, we investigated how perceived training effective-
ness differed as a function of Service branch, rank, gender,
and survivor status. More specifically, we assessed
employees’ judgments of training effectiveness on two key
outcomes: (1) reducing/preventing sexual assault, and (2)
explaining the difference between restricted and unre-
stricted reporting of sexual assault. In two ANOVAs,
branch, rank, gender, and survivor status served as
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predictors, and the two perceived effectiveness variables
served as criterion variables. To explore the possibility that
gender and survivor status may interact in predicting these
judgments, we also entered a gender X survivor status
interaction term. Due to the large discrepancy in the
number of past-year survivors (n = 430 women and 112
men) and past-year non-victims (n = 10,216 women and
15,747 men), we selected a random sample of 500 female
and 500 male past-year non-victims to create a more bal-
anced design for this analysis. We probed differences using
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons.
When predicting judgments of training effectiveness at
reducing/preventing sexual assault, the main effect of
Service branch was significant, F(4, 1,228) = 2.55,
p = .04. We observed the following mean differences
(ordered highest to lowest): Air Force (M = 3.26,
SD = .79), Marine Corps (M = 3.13, SD = .86), Navy
(M = 3.08, SD = .91), Army (M = 3.01, SD = .92),
Coast Guard (M = 2.99, SD = 1.03). Service members in
the Air Force judged training to be more effective than
those in the Army (p = .002, d = .29) and Coast Guard
(p = .01, d = .30). The main effect of rank was signifi-
cant, F(1, 1,228) = 6.33, p = .01. Enlisted personnel
(M = 3.13, SD = .90) perceived the training to be more
effective at actually reducing/preventing sexual assault
than Officers (M = 3.07, SD = .82), p = .01; this effect,
however, was small in magnitude, d = .07. The main
effect of gender was also significant, F(1, 1,228) = 10.19,
p \ .001. Service men (M = 3.28, SD = .83) perceived
the training to be more effective at reducing/preventing
sexual assault than Service women (M = 3.01, SD = .90),
p \ .001, d = .31. Additionally, there was a significant
main effect of survivor status, F(1, 1,228) = 23.27,
p \ .001. As expected, past-year non-victims (M = 3.27,
SD = .79) believed that training was more effective at
actually reducing/preventing sexual assault than those who
had experienced sexual assault in the past year (M = 2.80,
SD = .99), p \ .001, d = .53.
At the same time, there was a significant interaction
between gender and survivor status, F(1, 1,228) = 4.27,
p = .04. As depicted in Fig. 1, male past-year non-victims
(M = 3.32, SD = .81) perceived military training to be
more effective at reducing/preventing sexual assault than
both male past-year survivors [M = 3.01, SD = .95;
t(496) = 2.92, p = .001, d = .35] and female past-year
survivors [M = 2.74, SD = .98, t(736) = 8.80, p \ .001,
Table 2 Training exposure differences by military service/branch, rank, gender, and past-year survivor status
Service/branch Rank Gender Past-year survivor
status
Army Navy Marine
corps
Air
force
Coast
guard
Enlisted Officer Women Men Survivor Non-
victim
No training
Count 479 475 455 483 220 1,201 781 870 1,242 51 2,061
Expected 528.9 423.7 394.7 564.1 200.6 1,375.7 606.3 835.1 1,276.9 38.7 2,073.3
% Within
column
7.9 % 9.8 % 10.0 % 7.5 % 9.5 % 7.7 % 11.4 % 9.1 % 8.5 % 11.5 % 8.7 %
a, b c c b a, c a b a a a b
Minimal exposure
Count 397 419 409 326 168 1,318 324 724 996 75 1,645
Expected 430.7 345.1 321.4 459.4 163.4 1,139.7 502.3 680.1 1,039.9 31.6 1,688.4
% Within
column
6.5 % 8.6 % 9.0 % 5.0 % 7.3 % 8.4 % 4.7 % 7.5 % 6.8 % 16.9 % 6.9 %
a b b c a, b a b a b a b
Partial exposure
Count 1,843 1,591 1,433 1,668 843 4,558 2,266 3,030 4,384 149 7,229
Expected 1,847.6 1,480.2 1,378.9 1,970.5 700.8 4,736.4 2,087.6 2,917.4 4,460.6 135.4 7,242.6
% Within
column
30.3 % 32.7 % 31.6 % 25.7 % 36.6 % 29.2 % 32.9 % 31.6 % 29.7 % 33.5 % 30.4 %
a a a b c a b a b a a
Comprehensive exposure
Count 3,355 2,381 2,236 4,001 1,072 8,533 3,509 4,967 8,078 170 12,875
Expected 3,266.8 2,617.1 2,438.0 3,484.0 1,239.2 8,358.2 3,683.8 5,158.3 7,886.7 239.3 12,805.7
% Within
column
55.2 % 48.9 % 49.3 % 61.8 % 46.5 % 54.7 % 51.0 % 51.8 % 55.1 % 38.2 % 54.1 %
a b b c b a b a b a b
Within each training group, a different subscript indicates column proportions significantly differ from each other at p B .05
Am J Community Psychol (2014) 54:289–303 297
123
d = .65]. Similarly, female past-year non-victims
(M = 3.23, SD = .77) perceived training to be more
effective than both male past-year survivors
(t(497) = 2.17, p = .03, d = .26) and female past-year
survivors (t(764) = 7.75, p \ .001, d = .56). However,
female compared to male past-year survivors were less
likely to believe that training was effective, t(411) = 2.15,
p = .03, d = .28. Male and female past-year non-victims
did not differ in their judgments, t(822) = 1.64, p = .10.
When predicting judgments of training effectiveness at
explaining the difference between restricted and unre-
stricted reporting, we again found a significant main effect
of Service branch, F(4, 1,224) = 4.31, p = .002. Air Force
personnel (M = 3.50, SD = .72) perceived training to be
significantly more effective at explaining reporting options
than the Marines (M = 3.26, SD = .82, p = .02, d = .31)
and Coast Guard (M = 3.15, SD = 1.00, p = .01,
d = .41). There were no significant differences for either
the Navy (M = 3.27, SD = .89) or Army (M = 3.29,
SD = .86). We found no main effect of rank, F(1,
1,224) = 0.88, p = .35. That is, there were no significant
differences between Officers’ (M = 3.34, SD = .81) and
Enlisted personnel’s (M = 3.32, SD = .85) judgments that
training was effective at explaining the reporting options.
There was a significant main effect of gender, F(1,
1,224) = 4.72, p = .03. Women (M = 3.26, SD = .85)
perceived training to be less effective than men (M = 3.42,
SD = .81), p = .03, d = .19. We also found a significant
main effect of survivor status, F(1, 1,224) = 19.19,
p \ .001. Past-year sexual assault survivors (M = 3.09,
SD = .96) found training less effective at explaining the
difference between reporting options than past-year non-
victims (M = 3.44, SD = .75), p \ .001, d = .41. There
was no interaction between gender and survivor status
F(1,1,224) = 1.98, p = .16.
Discussion
Sexual assault is an insidious problem in the military work
environment, one that is disproportionately targeted against
women by men (Bell and Reardon 2011; Martin et al.
2000). Within the last decade, the DoD has made public
efforts to address the problem of sexual assault. The new
(as of 2005) SAPRO centralizes responsibility for sexual
assault training. However, these latest sexual assault
training efforts have undergone little empirical evaluation
by outside researchers. This was our goal.
First, we examined past-year exposure to sexual assault
training. Research by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO 2012) concluded that a majority of Service
members do receive sexual assault training. Similarly,
Kelley et al. (2005) evaluated the Navy’s Sexual Assault
Victim Intervention (SAVI) program, and reported that a
majority of participants were satisfied with training. These
studies, however, did not delve deeply into how much
training personnel received, whether it was comprehensive,
and whether training experiences varied across key
demographic subgroups. Most problematically, gender was
not given sufficient consideration. The U.S. military is over
85 % male, so any statistic that collapses across gender
privileges experiences of men over women. Given that only
1–2 % of Service men endure sexual assault (Bostock and
Daley 2007; Lipari et al. 2008; Street et al. 2008), this
foregrounds the perspective of military members at low
risk for being targeted with this act of violence.
In the current project, we found that approximately
93 % of participants had received military training on
topics related to sexual assault within the last year. At first
glance, this is reassuring, but closer analyses revealed
variation in reported training content across trainees.
Approximately 54 % of trainees described what amounts to
‘‘comprehensive’’ content coverage in their training,
addressing sexual assault actions, interventions, reporting
mechanisms, and resources. However, 30 % described
sexual assault training that, in our judgment, was ‘‘partial’’
in that it missed critical topics. Another 7 % of trainees
reported that the training they had undergone missed many
content domains, painting a picture of ‘‘minimal’’ cover-
age. Granted, these are subjective trainee-reported mea-
sures, and most likely some trainees had forgotten exactly
what their training covered (which is problematic in and of
itself, suggesting a need for post-training refreshers). Still,
if we follow standard military practice and take trainee
accounts at face value, what does their training exposure
predict in terms of key outcomes?
Prior research suggests that Service members’ experi-
ences of sexual assault training relate to important personal
and professional outcomes. For instance, positive percep-
tions of the Navy’s sexual assault training program
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Fig. 1 Interaction between gender and past-year survivor status
predicting perceptions that training is effective at reducing/preventing
sexual assault. A different subscript indicates that groups significantly
differ at p \ .05
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predicted better quality of life and job readiness (Kelley
et al. 2005). We investigated relationships between training
exposure and accurate knowledge of sexual assault
resources and protocols in the military (e.g., do employees
know that they can report unwanted sexual touching that
does not result in ‘‘completed’’ rape?). We found that
personnel in the Comprehensive Exposure group, who
described their training as covering a broad range of topics,
had significantly greater knowledge of sexual assault
resources and protocols than trainees who reported that
they had been exposed to only partial or minimal content.
Moreover, trainees reporting Minimal Exposure had no
more knowledge of resources and protocols than those who
had received no training at all. Thus, receiving deficient
training may be as problematic as going untrained.
This finding carries important implications. Survivors of
sexual assault are already at risk for experiencing adverse
personal and professional consequences as a result of the
trauma; lack of access to comprehensive sexual assault
training could further exacerbate their distress. Inadequate
training may leave victims unsure of their rights and
options, and potential responders (e.g., Commanding
Officers) unsure of how to manage the situation. Absent
adequate training with respect to the causes, experiences,
and outcomes of sexual assault, leadership will lack the
knowledge necessary to help survivors emotionally, pro-
fessionally, and legally. Deficient training could also per-
petuate an institutional culture that is ignorant or tolerant of
sexual assault. An organizational context that even infor-
mally tolerates sexualized violence can affect the incidence
of sexual assault (Firestone et al. 2012). Without proper
instruction, past and future offenders may not realize the
criminality of their actions. For example, they may not
know that sexual intercourse with a person too intoxicated
to give meaningful consent is a form of rape under military
(and civilian) law.
Sexual assault training is mandated for all Service
members and command staff (U. S. GAO 2012; Hillman
2009). However, our results found that training exposure
varies by both institutional and individual factors. Our
results suggest that Air Force personnel had the greatest
access to comprehensive sexual assault training. Con-
versely, those in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard
reported the least access to training and, when trained, the
lowest content exposure. It is interesting to compare this to
sexual assault incidence rates: a lower proportion of assault
survivors were serving in the Air Force than the Marine
Corps (a pattern consistent with past research, e.g., Hay
and Elig 1999). Thus, the Service branch (Air Force) that
stands out as exposing its members to the most compre-
hensive sexual assault training also has some of the lowest
rates of sexual assault. Though our research cannot speak
to causality, it is possible that military sexual assault
training may help reduce sexual assault, but only if it is
comprehensive.
We further found that Officers were less likely to receive
sexual assault training (in the past year) than Enlisted
personnel, and were more likely to describe training con-
tent coverage as partial. Officers may have greater expe-
rience with sexual assault training over the course of their
military careers, but in recent years (1) the DoD has sub-
stantively modified its sexual assault response procedures,
and (2) the Uniform Code of Military Justice has altered its
treatment of ‘‘rape, sexual assault, and other sexual mis-
conduct.’’ Officers must receive training on the new sexual
assault protocols, resources, and laws. Also, in the military
work environment, Officers are often the first point of
contact when survivors elect to report their sexual assault.
Thus, it is discouraging how many Officers reported either
no recent exposure to sexual assault training of any kind, or
exposure to training that was incomplete, missing topics
that are critical for report recipients to know.
Nevertheless, it is a definite strength of the military’s
training program that most newly enlisted Service mem-
bers were educated on sexual assault. One study found that
men with a history of perpetrating sexual violence (pre-
military) were almost 10 times more likely to attempt or
commit rape during their first year of military service
(McWhorter et al. 2008). Prior research also suggests that
lower-ranking Service members are at greater risk for
being victimized (Harned et al. 2002), a finding that we
replicated, with a greater proportion of Enlisted personnel
than Officers being survivors of military sexual assault in
the past year. Providing training to all newly enlisted
Service women and men helps ensure that they understand
the military’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual assault, the
consequences imposed on assailants, and the resources
available to survivors (Bell and Reardon 2011; Kelley et al.
2005). However, it is crucial for sexual assault training to
continue throughout Service members’ military careers.
Post-training activities and refreshers strengthen the
effectiveness of training programs (Perry et al. 2010).
Service women were more likely than Service men to
describe the coverage of content in sexual assault training
as lacking. Though this finding is based entirely on self-
report, there is good reason to trust women’s claims around
this issue. Women endure a greater amount of sexual
violence than men, in both military and civilian life (Bo-
stock and Daley 2007); as a result, women may (1) have
more knowledge about this issue prior to training, (2)
attend more closely to training, and (3) retain more
knowledge from the training—enabling them to describe
its content more accurately later. The same goes for sur-
vivors of sexual assault (both female and male), and past-
year survivors also described training as minimal in its
content coverage.
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In fact, past-year survivors were overrepresented among
personnel reporting no sexual assault training in the prior
year. Military sexual assault training often follows a group
format (e.g., U.S. GAO 2008), so if one person has gone
untrained, the same may be true of her/his entire work-
group or unit. This may increase the chance that someone
in the group sexually assaults her/him. We were unable to
test this hypothesis directly, as the WGRA does not collect
the data necessary to identify workgroups or units. This
precludes multi-level analyses (e.g., we could not test
whether absence of training at the group level predicts
sexual assault at the individual level); however, this is a
‘‘testable’’ possibility for future research.
Our final aim was to investigate training ‘‘effective-
ness,’’ using Service member judgments, a standard prac-
tice in the military that can offer valuable insight (Sackett
and Mullen 1993). The DoD’s 2010 annual report on
sexual assault in the military concluded that ‘‘most Active
Duty members receive effective training on sexual assault’’
(p. 104). However, our results question this sweeping
assertion. We found wide variation in judgments of how
effective training was at: (1) actually reducing/preventing
sexual assault, and (2) explaining the difference between
restricted and unrestricted reporting.
For instance, Service members in the Air Force per-
ceived training to be significantly more effective than
personnel in other Service branches. As discussed above,
Air Force personnel reported the greatest access to com-
prehensive sexual assault training as well. The SAPRO
requires each Military Service to maintain its own training
program (Department of Defense 2010), and our results
suggest that some Service branches may be more suc-
cessful in this effort than others. In addition, Officers were
less likely than Enlisted personnel to believe that training is
effective at preventing sexual assault. Given their relative
organizational power, and the military’s procedure for
unrestricted reporting, it is likely that many Officers had
greater knowledge of the frequency of sexual assaults
(Hillman 2009; Turchik and Wilson 2010). Moreover,
Officers are likely to have served for a longer period of
time, which may provide more insight into changes, or lack
thereof, in the frequency of sexual assault after training
was widely implemented. As expected, we found that
women and past-year sexual assault survivors (and, espe-
cially, female survivors) were less likely to judge training
as effective at reducing/preventing sexual assault and
explaining reporting options (i.e., the difference between
‘‘restricted’’ and ‘‘unrestricted’’ reporting) compared to
men and past-year non-victims.
These results suggest that the conclusion made in the
DOD’s 2010 Annual Report on Sexual Assault—that
training is ‘‘effective’’ because a ‘‘majority’’ of Service
members agree—is a vast overgeneralization. Most military
personnel are men who will never face (or even fear) sexual
assault. Given their sheer numbers, the perspectives of
male-non-victims are weighted more heavily than other
perspectives. In other words, these sweeping conclusions
minimize the voices of potential and past victims. Future
evaluations of military sexual assault training effectiveness
should focus more on the perspectives of those who have
been, and are more likely to be, affected by sexual violence.
However, future evaluations should also examine if training
affects, and hopefully decreases, sexually aggressive
behavior among potential perpetrators.
Prior research finds that experiencing sexual violence in
a military context may be more damaging to mental and
physical health than in other environments (Himmelfarb
et al. 2006). The perpetrator is frequently a fellow member
of the organization, and the victim must often continue
living and working alongside her/his assailant (Bell and
Reardon 2011). Furthermore, the military culture of loyalty
and self-sufficiency may hinder the victim’s ability to seek
help and increase the victim’s distress if assaulted by a
military member who was trusted and relied upon (Bell and
Reardon 2011). Women may be at an even greater risk
because they are substantially more likely than men to be
sexually assaulted while on active duty. Perceived institu-
tional and social support can mitigate some of the devas-
tating consequences of sexual assault (Campbell 2006;
Campbell et al. 2001a; David et al. 2006; Martin et al.
2000; Ullman 1999; Ullman and Filipas 2001); however,
we found that Service women and men who recently sur-
vived a sexual assault received inadequate information
about reporting. It is likely that survivors have given more
thought to and/or actually made use of reporting proce-
dures, so their views on training are especially valuable
(and, in the present study, deeply troubling).
Limitations and Future Directions
Like all projects, this study has its limitations. Our sec-
ondary analysis of cross-sectional, correlational data did
not allow us to establish causal relationships or assess
change over time. Additionally, it would have been bene-
ficial to consider participants’ length of military service
(not assessed in the 2010 WGRA) in our assessments of
training experiences. Examining whether sexual assault
survivors had actually made a restricted or unrestricted
report, and survivors’ satisfaction with reporting experi-
ences, would have added to our analysis of training
effectiveness; this information was collected in the 2010
WGRA, but was ‘‘removed to preserve confidentiality’’ in
the publicly available dataset (DMDC 2010, p. 23). There
are limitations to consider with the measures as well. For
instance, the measure of sexual assault only asked about
experiences in the past year. Given the high rates of sexual
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assault in the military, it is likely that many of the ‘‘non-
victims’’ had experienced sexual assault at some point in
their military career. Thus, the dichotomous measure of
survivor status (past-year survivor vs. past-year non-vic-
tim) will have missed experiences of military sexual
assault. The items assessing training exposure and effec-
tiveness were also highly subjective. More objective
measures (e.g., evaluating the content of training programs,
counting the hours of training each Service member
received) would have improved our assessment of training
exposure. Similarly, subjective measures of training
effectiveness only provide a partial picture of effectiveness.
For example, we were unable to make causal conclusions
about the effect of training on actual rates of sexual assault.
These limitations notwithstanding, there are many
strengths of this study. The data come from a very large
organizational sample (N [ 24,000), representing all
branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, both Enlisted and
Officer ranks, with women and personnel of color over-
sampled to ensure diversity. This study provides a detailed
look (not available elsewhere) at how military sexual
assault trainings are received and perceived. Many inter-
esting lines of inquiry can grow out of this project. For
instance, future research should ideally employ experi-
mental methods to evaluate training. A study by Rau et al.
(2010) evaluated the effectiveness of the Navy Sexual
Assault Intervention Training (SAIT) program for men,
and found that training increased rape knowledge and
empathy for rape victims, and reduced rape myth accep-
tance. These attitudinal changes were greatest among men
with no prior history of sexually coercive behavior (Rau
et al. 2010). The results of that study are encouraging, but
additional investigation is needed to assess the long-term
effects of training and the effectiveness of follow-up
trainings.
In addition, research should consider unanticipated
negative outcomes of training. For instance, is gender-
segregated sexual assault training (e.g., SAIT) more
effective than mixed-gender training, or does it perpetuate
harmful myths about women as weak, vulnerable, or vic-
timized (Hillman 2009)? Some studies of sexual assault
training on college campuses suggest benefits of same-
gender training groups (e.g., Brecklin and Forde 2001), but
others find positive results with mixed-gender groups (e.g.,
Anderson and Whiston 2005). As these findings suggest,
training content and delivery are not always one and the
same. Future assessments of military sexual assault training
should consider the gender makeup of training groups.
Further, although the SAPRO was designed to centralize
sexual assault trainings and victim advocacy services, our
results suggest that training exposure can vary widely.
Thus, future research should endeavor to understand how
each Service branch conducts training, both in terms of
content and mode of delivery.
Future studies should also evaluate the specific content
of military sexual assault training programs. Items in the
WGRA (e.g., ‘‘teaches how to avoid situations that might
increase the risk of being a victim of sexual assault’’)
suggest an emphasis on victim precipitation in training.
This effectively places the burden of responsibility on
victims rather than assailants, potentially eroding support
for survivors and exacerbating self-blame (Cass 2007).
Trainings that emphasize organizational/social factors and
challenge common rape myths may be more effective (e.g.,
Cass 2007; Lonsway 1996; Lonsway et al. 2001).
Conclusion
In line with a social-ecological perspective, sexual assault
research must carefully consider the role of context
(Campbell et al. 2009). By accounting for individual fac-
tors, organizational features, military community context,
and the current political climate, we discovered important
nuances in military sexual assault training. It has been
almost ten years since the DoD created the SAPRO, and the
U.S. GAO has called for systematic evaluation of SAPRO
training programs. The results of the current study heed this
call. Exposure to comprehensive training predicted lower
incidence of sexual assault and superior knowledge of
military sexual assault resources and protocols. This sug-
gests that military sexual assault training, when done right,
can be effective. Rates of exposure and judgments of
effectiveness, however, vary widely across this commu-
nity. Taken together, our results cast doubt on recent mil-
itary assertions that ‘‘most’’ members of the U.S. Armed
Forces receive ‘‘effective’’ training on sexual assault.
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